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Staying True to Purpose: Including
Corporate Debtors Under § 362(h) of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code
D. CASEY KoBm*

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act' (commonly referred to
as the "Federal Bankruptcy Code"), academics and practitioners alike have debated
the Federal Bankruptcy Code's purpose and, specifically, how that purpose is to be
applied in enforcing the Code's terminology.3 This debate appears in the application
of § 362(h) 4 of the Bankruptcy Code, which is presently the subject of significant
controversy and a circuit-court split. Section 362(h) is part of the automatic stay
provision of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.' When a debtor files a petition in
bankruptcy, the automatic stay provides a breathing spell from the collection efforts
of creditors by allowing the debtor, under court supervision, to either establish a plan
for financial reorganization or to liquidate its assets for distribution to creditors.6
Because the automatic stay provides fundamental rights to debtors as well as
creditors, courts may penalize violators of the stay by awarding damages pursuant to
§ 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.7
The issue that federal courts are struggling with is whether corporations can use §
362(h) to recover damages from violators of the automatic stay. The answer turns on
the interpretation of the word "individual" as it appears in § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Some courts hold that § 362(h) can be used by corporate debtors to collect
damage awards, while others hold the section applicable only to debtors who are
natural persons. At present, six federal circuit courts have considered the issue of
whether a corporation is an "individual" under § 362(h). The Second, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits each interpret the term "individual" to include only natural

* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1997,
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University-Bloomington. I would like to thank my
parents, Neil and Deborah Kobi, and my sister, Colleen Kobi, for their unconditional love and
steadfast support. A special thanks is in order for my sister, Janel Kobi, who provided helpful
comments on multiple drafts of this Note. Also, I would like to thank Professor Kellye Testy
for her guidance in helping me select a topic for this Note and her comments and suggestions
on earlierdrafts of this Note.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified
as amended at I I U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
2. For an example of this debate, compare Douglas G.Baird, Loss Distribution,Forum
Shopping,and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cu. L. REv. 815, 829-34 (1987), with
Elizabeth Warren, BankruptcyPolicy, 54 U. Cn. L. Rnv. 775, 776-79 (1987).
3. See Thomas G. Kelch,AnApologyforPlain-MeaningInterpretationofthe Bankruptcy
Code, I0 BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 295 (1994).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994).
5. II U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6. Id.; see also H.R REP. No. 95-595, at 34-42 (1978), reprintedin .1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6296-98.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
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persons! Conversely, the Third and Fourth Circuits each hold that § 362(h) must be
interpreted to include corporations. 9 This conflict arises from the courts' inability to
apply a uniform definition to the word "indi'idual" as used in § 362(h).
This Note will address whether a corporation is an "individual" entitled to recover
damages under § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Part II of this Note will
briefly discuss the evolution and function of the automatic stay. Part I of this Note
will (1) analyze the competing circuit courts' interpretations of§ 362(h); (2) present
theU. S. Supreme Court's standard for interpretation ofthe Federal Bankruptcy Code
and analyze the standard's applicability to § 362(h); (3) address contempt as an
alternative remedy when a corporate debtor has been injured by a violation of an
automatic stay; and (4) discuss the future application of§ 362(h) to corporate entities.
Finally, Part IV of this Note will conclude by arguing that § 362(h) should be
interpreted to include corporations thereby providing corporate debtors, injured by
a violation of a stay, with an adequate remedy under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
II. BACKGROUND
Legal scholars and historians have traced the origins of American bankruptcy laws
back to 118 B.C. Roman law.'" By the eighteenth century, English bankruptcy laws
were well established and emulated by the colonies and later adopted by the states."
A general understanding of the historical development of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code is helpful in understanding the dilemma § 362(h) poses for corporate debtors.
This Part briefly explains the evolution of § 362(h) and the application of the
automatic stay under § 362 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Additionally, this Part
illustrates the conflicting judicial interpretations of § 362(h).
A. Evolution of FederalBankruptcy Code § 362(h)
When the U.S. Constitution was framed in 1787, Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 gave
Congress the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptc[y]."' 2 In
1800, Congress adopted the first American bankruptcy law, which paralleled the
English bankruptcy laws of that time. 3 Over the course of the nineteenth century,

8. Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 E.3d 881,
884 (8th Cir. 1997); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d
1147 (9th Cir. 1996); Jove.Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1550-53
(11 th Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 618-20 (9th
Cir. 1993); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d
183, 184-86 (2d Cir. 1990).
9. Cuffee v. At. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325,
329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,292 (4th Cir.
1986).
10. Ven Countryman, A History ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law, 81 CoM. L.J. 226, 226
(1976).
11. Id. at 227-29;see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, TheEvolution ofModern BanknrptcyLaw,
31 MINN. L. REv. 401,421-23 (1947).

4.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
13. Charles J. Tabb, The HistoricalEvolutionoftheBankruptcyDischarge,65 AM. BANKR.
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subsequentbankruptcy acts were adoptedbyCongress and laterrepealed. 1 4Currently,
there are two different federally enacted bankruptcy statutes that lawyers and students
encounter.
First is the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which is commonly referred to as the
"Bankruptcy Act." Cases filed prior to October 1, 1979, are controlled by the
Bankruptcy Act. 5 A significant number of cases decided in the 1980s and 1990s cite
to, and directly rely on, the 1898 Act.'" The second statute relied upon is the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which is commonly referred to as the "Bankruptcy
Code.""7 Cases filed after October 1, 1979, are controlled by the Bankruptcy Code.'
A number of the Bankruptcy Code's sections are derived from the Bankruptcy Act
and have been substantially amended in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 19942,
Specifically, this Note addresses the current conflict arising from the federal circuit
courts ofappeals' inconsistent interpretations of§ 362(h)20 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code. Section 362(h), at issue here, was added to the Code by the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Since the enactment of § 362(h),
federal courts' and legal scholars' have grappled with the issue of whether a
corporate entity can use § 3 62(h) to recover damages for a violation of an automatic
stay.
B. Application of an Automatic Stay Under FederalBankruptcy Code § 362
The automatic stay, to which § 362(h) pertains, is a central feature of bankruptcy
law.24 After filing abankruptcypetition, a debtorrequires immediate protection from
collection attempts by creditors. The automatic stay provided for by § 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code provides debtors with a broad stay of litigation, lien enforcement,

L.J. 325, 344-45 (1991).
14. Id. at 350-66. See generally Max Radin, The Nature ofBankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
1,3-6 (1940).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also ROBERT L. JORDAN ET AL, BANKRUPTCY 20 (5th ed. 1999).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994).
21. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
304, 98 Stat. 333, 352 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)).
22. Compare Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. &Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In reAti. Bus. &Cmty. Corp.), 901
F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) applicable to corporate debtors), and
Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,292 (4th Cir. 1986) (same), with
Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 618-20 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding I1 U.S.C. § 362(h) not applicable to corporate debtors), and Mar. Asbestosis Legal
Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184-86 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
23. See, e.g., WILuAM L. NORTON, JR., Violation ofStay 362(h), in NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 36:42 (1997); Peter H. Carroll, III, Statutory Construction by the
Ninth Circuit in Recent Bankruptcy Cases, 22 CAL. BANKR. J.262,267-68 (1995).
24. Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296, and S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41, 5963, 6296-97).
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and other actions that attempt to enforce or collect claims.' Whether a debtor
voluntarily files for reorganization or is involuntarily forced to liquidate assets, she
will need time to prepare a plan or to convert the petition. Regardless of the debtor's
situation, the creditor's collection efforts must be halted immediately in order to
provide for an orderly and even administration of the debtor's financial affairs.'
The automatic stay provision provides an immediate and necessary benefit to the
debtor. Section 362(a) "gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor
to attempt a repayment or reorganizdtion plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy."27 Also, the automatic stay freezes and
maintains the status quo between creditors who are competing for the debtor's
assets. ' Once the bankruptcy petition is filed, one creditor cannot advance his claim
over the other creditors.29 For creditors, the stay provides protection from other
creditors. In the absence of the automatic stay, creditors would be able to pursue
individual remedies against the debtor's assets. "Those who acted first would obtain
payment of the claims in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.
Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all
creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets

25. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
26. Section 362(a) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code requires that all collection attempts
should cease upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The filing of a petition operates as a stay
of collection activities described in eight numbered subparts of §362(a). The stayed activities
are as follows:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of ajudicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgement obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor,
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id.
27. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6296-97.
28. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 931 F.2d 984, 987 (1st Cir.
1991), vacated on othergrounds by 983 F.2d 1122 (1st Cir. 1993).
29. See id.
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30

prevents that.
The scope of the automatic stay is very broad and intends to prevent virtually every
creditor from collection efforts.3 ' A creditor is not only stayed from pursuing legal
and administrative remedies against the debtor,32 he is also stayed from any efforts
attempting to secure payment.33 Therefore, upon a debtor's filing of a bankruptcy
petition, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the automatic stay of § 362 of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code takes effect. The stay applies to all entities andprovides for
an injunction against litigation, lien enforcement, or other actions taken against a
debtor to enforce or collect claims.34 In addition, the stay prevents many other actions,
formal or informal, that might affect property or the estate of the debtor.35
C. The Conflict UnderFederalBankruptcy Code § 362(h)
Section 362(h) 36 provides for recovery of damages, costs, and attorney's fees by an
individual injured by a violation of the automatic stay.37 All collection efforts that
violate the automatic stay are void even if taken without knowledge of the stay. 38 The
statute provides:
An individualinjured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.39
Further, courts have interpreted "willful violation" to mean "with knowledge," either
actual or constructive, that a formal bankruptcy petition has been filed with the
court. The standard for the award of damages under § 362(h) is (1) whether the
defendant had knowledge of the stay, and (2) whether the actions that violated the

30. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
31. See 3 COLERON BANKRupTCY 362.01 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15 ed. rev. 2000).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1994).
33. Id. § 362(a)(6).
34. Id.
35. See John C. Chobot, Some BankruptcyStay Metes andBounds,99CoM. L.J. 301,30204 (1994).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
37. Pettitt v. Baker, 876 F.2d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1989); Goichman v. Bloom (In re
Bloom), 875 F.2d 224,225 (9th Cir. 1989); Archer v. Macomb County Bank, 853 F.2d 497,
499 (6th Cir. 1988).
38. E.g., Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Office ofThrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020,1022 (10th Cir.
1994); Raymark Indus. v. Lai, 973 F.2d 1125, 1128 (3d Cir. 1992); Schwartz v. United States
(In re Schwartz), 954 F.2d 569,574-75 (9th Cir. 1992); Mar. Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank,
959 F.2d 1194,1204 (3d Cir. 1991).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (emphasis added).
40. See Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med. Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1087-89 (3d
Cir. 1992); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 831-33 (7th Cir. 1991); Atkins v. Martinez (In
re Atkins), 176 B.R 998, 1008 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994); In re Herbst, 167 B.R. 983, 985
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994); Temlock v. Falls Bldg., Ltd. (In re Falls Bldg., Ltd.), 94 B.R. 471,
481-82 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); Stucka v. United States (In re Stucka), 77 B.R. 777,782-83
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
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stay were intentional. 4 Courts do not require specific intent to violate the automatic
stay.42 It is therefore irrelevant ifa defendant believed in good faith that he had a right
to the debtor's assets.43 Moreover, if the violation is egregious, the debtor may be
awarded punitive damages."
The current interpretive conflict between federal circuit courts of appeals is
whether a corporation is considered an "individual" under § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The language of the 1984 Amendment, 45 adding § 362(h) to the Code, confines
damages to "individual" debtors.46 Prior to the Amendment,; courts exercised
discretion in awarding damages for violations of the automatic stay to individual and
nonindividual debtors.47 Currently, it is unclear whether courts can award damages
to corporate debtors under § 362(h). Several courts have considered whether § 3 62(h)
applies to corporations and their trustees or whether its reach is limited to
"individuals"-meaning natural persons-as explicitly stated in the statute.
The federal circuit courts of appeals are split when called upon to interpret § 3 62(h)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Some circuit courts of appeal have interpreted §
362(h) to allow corporations and partnerships to recover damages for violations of
the automatic stay.4" However, other circuits have held that the plain language of §
362(h) limits its application to individual debtors.49 Due to the confusion surrounding
the interpretation, coupled with the current circuit-court split, the question ofwhether
a corporate debtor is an individual under § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code

41. In re Bloom, 875 F.2d at 227; Meis-Nachtrab v. Griffin (In re Meis-Nachtrab), 190
B.R. 302, 306-07 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995).
42. Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1555 (1 Ith Cir. 1996);
Kirk v. Shawmut Bank (In re Kirk), 199 B.R. 70, 72 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996).
43. Honeycutt v. Rickman (In re Honeycutt), 198 B.R. 306,308 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996);
Official Comm. ofUnsecured Creditors v. Riviera Med. Dev. Corp. (In re S.BayMed. Assoc.),
184 B.R. 963, 970 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h); Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Ati. Bus. & Cmty.
Corp.), 901 F.2d 325, 328-29 (3d Cir. 1990); Smith v. GTE N., Inc. (In re Smith), 170 B.R.
I 11, 113-15, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
45. Under Title III, Subtitle A ofthe 1984 Consumer Credit Amendments, Congress added
subsection (h) to § 362 (the automatic stay provision) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.No. 98-353, §§ 301-324,
98 Stat. 333, 352-58 (codified at I1 U.S.C. § 362 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
47. See, e.g., In re Doan's Truck Repair, Inc., 34 B.R. 180, 183 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1983).
48. See In reAd. Bus., 901 F.2d at 329 (finding § 362(h) applicable to corporations and
partnerships); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,292 (4th Cir. 1986)
(upholding compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees for a violation of a stay as
to a corporate debtor).
49. See Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d
881, 884 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding § 362(h) not applicable to corporate debtor); Cal.
Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996)
(refusing to sanction under § 362(h) because the Chapter 7 trustee was not an "individual");
Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1551 (1Ith Cir. 1996) (holding
§ 362(h) does not include corporations); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding § 362(h) not applicable to
corporate debtor).
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is ripe for Supreme Court consideration. This Note will proceed to analyze the
competing arguments surrounding the interpretation of § 362(h) while adopting the
view that corporate debtors injured by violations of the automatic stay should be
provided a legal remedy under the Bankruptcy Code.
III. ANALYSIS

Section 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code was established to provide a legal
remedy for those harmed by a violation of the § 362(a) automatic stay. In setting forth
this remedy, Congress created confusion with the use of the term "individual" and its
application. This Part will (1) analyze the conflicting circuits' application of§ 362(h),.
(2) consider the U. S. Supreme Court's standard of interpretation for the Bankruptcy
Code and its application to § 362(h), (3) address contempt as an alternative remedy,
and (4) discuss what the future may hold for § 362(h).
A. Majority Rule: A CorporationIs Not an "Individual" Under§ 362(h)
Four circuits have refused to allow corporations to recover damages under § 362(h)
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.5" The Second Circuit and an increasing number of
bankruptcy courts have strictly interpreted the term "individual" to apply only to
natural persons. In Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.),5 the debtor, LTV Steel Co. ("LTV"), filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcypetition on July 17, 1986.2 Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic ("MALC")
represented 220 merchant seamen with claims pending in federal court in the Eastern
District of Michigan which derived from exposure to asbestos . during their
employment at LTV. 53 Subsequent to LTV's petition for bankruptcy, in March of
1989, MALC continued litigation of tort claims in the Northern District of Ohio
naming LTV as a defendant in thirty-eight amended complaints.' In response to the
complaints, LTV sought an order from the court enjoining the continuation of the
actions and an award of compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to § 362(h)."5
The bankruptcy court awarded LTV compensatory damages of $7600 and
permanently enjoined MALC from litigation efforts due to a willful violation of the
stay under § 362(h).' When the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling,
MALC appealed to the Second Circuit arguing that a corporate debtor is not
permitted to recover damages under § 362(h).'
The Second Circuit overturned the district court's decision, holding that
corporations cannot recover damages under § 362(h). The court reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Code fails to define "individual" while defining the term "person" in §

50. See In reJustBrakes, 108 F.3d at 884; In re DelMission, 98 F.3d at 1152; In reJove
Eng'g, 92 F.3d at 1551; In re Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 186.
51. 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id.
54. Id.

55. Id. at 184.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 184.
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101(41)58 to encompass "individual, partnership, and corporation."59
In comparing the
use of the terms "person" and "individual" in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code,
the Second Circuit laid out a theory of statutory interpretation that differentiated
between the rights held by natural persons and the rights accorded to corporations.'
Through a negative inference, the Second Circuit held that only "natural persons" are
capable of recovering damages under § 362(h).6' Further, the court concluded that
there is no legislative history that suggests § 362(h) was enacted to apply to "persons"
as opposed to only "individuals"; therefore, Congress's intent was to preclude
corporations from recovering damages under § 362(h).62
Three years later, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the term "individual," as
used in § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, was broad enough to include corporations.
In Johnston Environmental Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals denied corporations the use of § 362(h) to obtain damages against
creditors who violated the automatic stay." The Ninth Circuit adopted similar
reasoning as the Second Circuit,65 and highlighted the importance of limiting § 362(h)
solely to natural persons."
In In re Goodman, the corporate debtor subleased apiece of commercial real estate
owned by the Knights.67 Following closing of the lease agreement, the debtor-tenant
filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, and gave the Knights actual notice of the
pending proceedings.6" When the debtor's use of the real estate resulted in the

58. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1994).
59. In re Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 184 (quoting I1 U.S.C. § 101(41)).
60. See id. at 184-85.
Although the code does not define "individual," it does define "person" in §
101(35) [sic] to include "individual, partnership, and corporation ...."
Throughout the code, rights and duties are allocated in some instances to
"individuals" and in others to "persons." Section 109, "Who may be a debtor,"
uses "person" in certain situations and "individual" in others. Chapter 13 of the
code is available only to an "individual with regular income ...or an individual
with regular income and such individual's spouse.... ." The text of other code
sections demonstrates that Congress used the word "individual" rather than
"person" to mean a natural person. To cite but one additional example, § 101 (39)
defines "relative" as an "individual related by affinity or consanguinity within the
third degree as determined by the common law, or individual in a step or adoptive
relationship within such third degree." Plainly, the statute here is referring only
to human beings; corporations and other legal entities can have no such "affinity
or consanguinity" or "step... relationship" except in the metaphoric sense, and
can in no sense have an "adoptive relationship."
Id. (emphasis in original) (omissions in original) (citation omitted).
61. Id. at 186-87.
62. Id. at 186.
63. 991 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1993).
64. Id. at 619.
65. See supra text accompanying note 60 (noting the reasoning used by the Second Circuit
in In re Chateaugay,and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in In re Goodman).
66. See In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 620.
67. Id. at 615.
68. Id.
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violation of municipal ordinances and the Knights were faced with possible criminal
prosecution, they commenced an unlawful detainer action in state court against all of
the tenants, including the debtor.69 Next, the Knights filed a unilateral stipulation in
bankruptcy court in which they attempted to exempt the corporate debtor from the
results of the unlawful detainer action filed in state court. °
The bankruptcy court rejected the unilateral stipulation and held that the Knights
violated the automatic stay that enjoined them from pursuing the unlawful detainer
action." However, the court refused the debtor's request for damages under § 362(h),
holding that the actions were not willful as required by the Bankruptcy Code.' On
appeal, the federal district court affirmed the permanent injunction against the
Knights but reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that the stay violation was not
willful under the Bankruptcy Code.' 3 The district court held that the Knights violated
§ 362(a)' 4 and were liable for a damage award under § 362(h). Prior to remand for a
determination of damages under § 362(h), the Knights appealed to the Ninth Circuit
arguing that a corporate debtor was not capable of recovering damages under §
362(h). 5
In applying the Second Circuit's interpretation of§ 362(h), the Ninth Circuit held
that the word "individual" does not include corporations or other artificial entities. 6
The court went further to state that the analysis of other circuit courts, finding that a
corporation is an individual, was inconsistent with the principles of statutory
interpretation exhibited by the Supreme Court." Concluding, the Ninth Circuit held
that the appropriate remedy for a corporation injured by violation of the automatic
stay fell under an action for civil contempt' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished between mandatory damages awarded to corporate debtors under §
362(h) and discretionary damages awarded under the civil contempt-of-court theory. 9
The Eleventh Circuit, in Jove Engineering,Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Engineering,
Inc.),8" adopted the same line of analysis as the Second Circuit, holding that a Chapter
11 corporate debtor was not an individual entitled to relief under § 362(h).8" In In re

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 26.
75. In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 615-16.
76. Id. at 619. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
We conclude that the Second Circuit's determination in [In re] Chateaugayis
correct: "individual" means individual, and not a corporation or other artificial
entity. The Second Circuit's reasoning, which we adopt, is as follows: "We have
not located any legislative history to suggest that § 362(h) was meant to apply to
'persons,' rather than being confined to 'individuals."'
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1990)).
77. Id. at 619; see also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,242 (1989).
78. See In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 620.
79. Id.
80. 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996).
81. Id. at 1550.
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JoveEngineering,the corporation sought damages from the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") for a violation of the automatic stay. The district court held that, although the
IRS violated the stay, the debtor was not entitled to relief under § 362(h) because the
term "individual" is limited to natural persons and does not include corporations or
artificial entities.82 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed "with the reasoning [ofthe
Second Circuit] in [In re] Chateaugayand conclude[d] that the district court correctly
held that the term 'individual' in § 362(h) does not include a-corporation. ' The In
re Jove Engineering court went further to state that due to a lack of legislative
history, interpreting "individual" to exclude corporate debtors is not at odds with the
legislature's intent." Therefore, "we may reasonably assume Congress only intended
§ 362(h) to benefit natural persons."85
The most recent circuit court decision to interpret § 3 62(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
was handed down by the Eighth Circuit in Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C.(In re Just
Brakes CorporateSystems, Inc.).' Following the lead of the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits, the Eighth Circuit held the plain meaning of the word "individual"
as used in § 362(h) applies only to individual debtors, not to corporate entities such
as Just Brakes.' In In re Just Brakes, creditors obtained a court order directing payout of net proceeds from the foreclosure sale of the corporate debtor's only valuable
asset, its registered trademark. In response, the Chapter 7 trustee brought an action
seeking to enjoin assignment of the trademark as a fraudulent conveyance and to
recover damages from creditors for a violation of the automatic stay.88 Although
notified of the debtor's Chapter 7 filing, the state court allowed the sale of the
trademark to proceed and ordered the revenue to be held in escrow until the creditor's
rights were established. 9 Nine days later, the creditors petitioned the state court for
the proceeds of the trademark and were awarded the net sale price.' ° In response, the
trustee brought action to recover the sale proceeds for the estate, arguing that the
assignment of the trademark was a fraudulent conveyance and damages should be
awarded for violation of the automatic stay under § 362(h). The case was then
transferred to the bankruptcy court for resolution. 9'
The bankruptcy court granted a motion for summary judgement in favor of the
Chapter 7 trustee. The court found a violation of the stay because the creditors
applied the trademark revenues to their pre-petition judgement, knowing that the
debtor filed a petition to recover the trademark.92 In determining the remedy, "the
court concluded that it riay 'award [c]ompensation and punishment' for willful

82. Id. at 1552-53.
83. Id. at 1550 (emphasis in original) (citing Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co.
(In' re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1990)).
84. Id. at 1551.
85. Id.
86. 108 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1997).
87. See id. at 884.
88. Id. at 883.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.

2001]

INCLUDING CORPORATE DEBTORS UNDER § 362(H)

253

violation of the automatic stay in a contempt proceeding" 93 but that further damages
are not available to corporate debtors under § 362(h). The bankruptcy court awarded
only the trademark proceeds to the Chapter 7 trustee and the district court affirmed
that decision.' The creditor then appealed to the Eighth Circuit challenging the
decision on the grounds that it violated the automatic stay and that the damage award
was inappropriate.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held the creditors' (appellants') actions "prejudiced
the [t]rustee's ability to litigate a competing avoidance claim on behalf of all creditors
and was ... inconsistent with the basic purpose of the automatic stay.... [Therefore,
t]he bankruptcy court correctly concluded that appellants violated the automatic
'
On the issue of damages, the Eighth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's
stay."95
award under the theory of contempt powers.9 However, the court went further to
explicitly state that "§ 362(h) only applies to 'individual' debtors, not corporate
entities."9 The Eighth Circuit expressed its adoption of the Second Circuit's view,
explaining that the plain meaning of the word "individual" excludes corporations
from recovering damages under § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 8 Further,
the Eighth Circuit rejected all contrary circuit decisions holding that corporate debtors
are individuals capable of receiving damage awards under § 362(h).'
In sum, the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals hold
that § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code is available only to natural persons."
These circuits, which currently represent the majority position, find that the term
"individual," as used in § 362(h), does not include corporate entities.'' The analysis
follows the line of reasoning that because the term "individual" is generally used in
the Code to suggest natural persons, it should always be interpreted to mean natural
persons. An example of the courts' reasoning is as follows: since, under the

93. Id.
94. See id. at 884.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 885.
97. Id. at 884.
98. Id. at 884-85.
99. Id. (rejecting Cuffee v. At!. Bus. &Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re At. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.),
901 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990), and holding § 362(h) applicable to corporations); Budget
Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) (awarding
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees for a violation bf a stay as to a
corporate debtor upheld on appeal).
100. See, e.g., In re Just Brakes, 108 F.3d at 884 (holding § 362(h) not applicable to
corporate debtor); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d
1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing to sanction under § 362(h) because the Chapter 7 trustee
was not an "individual"); Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1551
(11 th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 362(h) does not include corporations); Johnston Envtl. Corp.
v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a corporation is
not an "individual" under § 362(h)); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co., (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding § 362(h) not applicable to
corporate debtor).
101. See In reJustBrakes, 108 F.3d at 884; In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 1150; In reJove
Eng'g,92 F.3d at 1551; In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 619; In re Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 18687.
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Bankruptcy Code, only an "individual" with regular income can file a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition, only natural persons can use Chapter 13 and corporate debtors
must reorganize under Chapter 11.12 Thus, because the use of the term "individual"
in Chapter 13 petitions is interpreted to apply only to natural persons, the word
"individual" must be construed the same throughout the Bankruptcy Code. 3
Further, the majority position also points to § 101 " oftheBankruptcyCode, which
defines "relative" as an "individual related by affinity or consanguinity within the
third degree."'0 5 The majority position observes that corporations are not capable of
relations byaffmity or consanguinity; therefore, the term "individual" must be limited
to natural persons. Finally, the majority position also relies upon the absence of
legislative history indicating that the term "individual" was intended to refer to
corporations; thus, there is no reason why rejection of a broad interpretation would
contradict congressional intent."° Therefore, the majority rule is that the term
"individual," as used in § 362(h) of the Federal BankruptcyCode, islimited to natural
persons and excludes corporations from recovering a remedy for injuries sustained
from a violation of the automatic stay.
B. MinorityRule: A CorporationIs an "Individual" Under§ 362(h)
Two circuits have allowed corporations to recover damages under § 362(h) of the
Federal Bankruptcy Code. 0 7 Two years after Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, which included § 362(h), the
Fourth Circuit was called upon to decide whether corporations injured by a violation
of the automatic stay could recover damages under the Bankruptcy Code. The
landmark case, in which the Fourth Circuit was the first to interpret § 362(h), was
Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes of Virginia,Inc. 10 8
In Budget Service, Better Homes, the corporate debtor, filed a bankruptcy petition
for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Consistent with the

102. The Federal Bankruptcy Code restricts the use of Chapter 13 to "individuals" with
regular income who meet the debt limits, whereas, Chapter 11 ofthe Bankruptcy Code can be
used by corporations and partnerships. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1994).
103. Id. § 109(d); see also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991).
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(45).
105. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Jove Eng'g, 92 F.-3d at 1551 n. 11; In re
Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 184-85.
106. See generally In re Just Brakes, 108 F.3d at 884 (finding § 362(h) not applicable to
corporate debtor); In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 1152 (refusing to sanction under § 362(h)
because the Chapter 7 trustee was not an "individual"); In reJoveEng'g,92 F.3d at 1539 (1 th
Cir. 1996) (holding that § 362(h) does not include corporations); In re Chateaugay,920 F.2d
at 186-87 (holding § 362(h) not applicable to corporate debtor); Ga. Scale Co. v. Toledo Scale
Corp. (In re Ga. Scale Co.), 134 B.R. 69, 73 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1991) (holding § 362(h)
damages not available to corporations).
107. See, e.g., Cuffee v. Atl. Bus. &Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Ati. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901
F.2d 325,329 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) applicable to corporations); Budget
Sere. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding award
of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees for a violation of a stay as to
a corporate debtor).
108. 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
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reorganization petition, the debtor continued to operate its business."°9 Budget
Service, the creditor, was in the business of leasing motor vehicles. Prior to the
bankruptcy petition, the debtor leased three automobiles from the creditor. Once the
debtor stopped making its lease payments, the creditor became concerned and
resorted to self-help to reclaim the motor vehicles." oThe creditor went to the debtor's
business premises and drove away with one of the leased vehicles. The following day
the creditor, accompanied by two employees, returned to the corporate debtor's
premises to take possession of the two remaining leased vehicles. The creditor's
second attempt at repossession caused a two-hour disruption in the debtor's
business."' In response to the creditor's repossession of the leased vehicles, the
debtor filed a motion in bankruptcy court seeking a contempt order against the
creditor for the violation of the automatic stay. "2 The bankruptcy court found for the
debtor and held the creditor in contempt for a violation of the stay. The district court
affirmed the finding of the bankruptcy court, and the creditor appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, challenging the authority of the bankruptcy court to impose a sanction of
contempt."'
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit did not decide the issue of whether the bankruptcy
court possessed the authority to hold the creditor in civil contempt. Rather, the Fourth
Circuit chose to analyze the case under § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code." 4 In
affirming the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the bankruptcy
court clearlypossessed the authority under § 362(h) to award compensatory damages,
punitive damages, and attorney's fees to the corporate debtor for a violation of the
automatic stay."' The court interpreted the word "individual," in § 362(h) to include
corporations." 6
The Fourth Circuit's analysis stated that § 362(h) must be interpreted in
conjunction with the rest of § 362 and that its remedies are not limited to
"individuals" in the literal sense of natural persons. 1 7 The court acknowledged that
the Bankruptcy Code does not define the word "individual," but went further to find
it unlikely "that Congress meant to give a remedy only to individual debtors against
those who willfully violate the automatic stay provision of the Code as opposed to
debtors which are corporations or other like entities.""' 8 The Fourth Circuit grounded
its analysis on the concept that such a narrow construction of the term "individual"
would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay." 9
Section 362 generally provides for an automatic stay from collection proceedings

109. Id. at 290.
110. Id. at 291.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 292-93; see also Carroll, supra note 23, at 269; Peter H. Carroll, III,
Literalism: The United States Supreme Court'sMethodologyfor Construction in Bankruptcy
Cases,25 ST. MARY's L.J. 143, 168. (1993).
115. Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 293.
116. Id. at 292.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 76:243

once a bankruptcy petition is filed. 2 ' The court noted that the importance of the
automatic stay is stated in the legislative history of § 362, which provides:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of
the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.' 2'
The Fourth Circuit held that due to the importance of the automatic stay, Congress
could not have intended remedies for a violation of § 362 to be available only to
natural persons. According to the court, a narrow interpretation of the term
"individual" discriminates between natural persons and corporate entities, therefore
undermining the remedies available to all debtors under § 362.1' The court reasoned
in conclusion that because corporate debtors are entitled to protection under § 3 62 of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code, they are likewise entitled to legal remedies for injuries
suffered from violations of § 362.
Four years later, the Third Circuit was called upon to interpret § 362(h) in Cuffee
v. AtlanticBusiness and Community Development Corp.(In reAtlantic Business and
Community Corp.).12 The court adopted the view of the Fourth Circuit and granted
relief under § 362(h) to a corporate debtor. 24 The Third Circuit found that § 362(h)
"has uniformly been held applicable to a corporate debtor."' In In re Atlantic
Business, the corporate debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition with the bankruptcy court.
Following the petition, the debtor continued to operate its radio station.'2 6 The
creditor owned the building, office furnishings, studio equipment, and albums used
by the debtor.'27 Subsequent to the debtor's bankruptcy filing, the creditor attempted
to repossess the radio station and to evict the debtor from the premises. In response,
the trustee for the debtor's estate filed an order requesting the creditor to explain why
he should not be held in contempt for violating the stay.'28 The bankruptcy court
issued an order restraining the creditor from further interference with the operation
of the radio station.' 29 However, the creditor continued his efforts to take possession
of the station.
In further proceedings, the bankruptcy court found that the creditor willfully
violated the stay provisions and awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages,
and attorneys' fees under § 362(h). On appeal, the district court affirmed the decision

120. I1U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
121. Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,6296, and S. REP. No.95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840-41, 5963, 6296-97).
122. Id. at 292 (holding that a narrow construction would defeat the purpose of§ 362).
123. 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 329.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 326.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 326-27.
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of the bankruptcy court.130 Unsatisfied with the district court decision, the creditor
appealed to the Third Circuit, which found that the creditor had willfully violated the
stay and, moreover, while acknowledging that § 362(h) applies to corporate debtors,
upheld the damage award.' 3' The Third Circuit promptly addressed the issue by citing
Budget Service Co. v. BetterHomes of Virginia, Inc.'32 and holding that § 362(h) of
the Bankruptcy Code is applicable to corporations."' In In reAtlantic Business, the
Third Circuit did not elaborate on the Budget Service holding, nor did the court
produce further reasoning that expands on the analysis used by the Fourth Circuit.
The Third and Fourth Circuits correctly look past the literal meaning of the term
"individual" used in § 362(h) and conclude that corporate entities are entitled to
protection under § 362 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.'34 This expansive approach,
as adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuits, relies upon legislative history and a
consideration of all the subsections of § 362 construed together. Bankruptcy courts
that adopt this approach point to the breadth of the automatic stay or the legislative
history of § 362 as grounds for going beyond the plain meaning of the term
"individual" to achieve equitable results and a uniform application of remedies for
a violation of the automatic stay.' Failing to adopt the Third and Fourth Circuits"
line of reasoning and choosing to assume the majority position in effect denies
corporate debtors a legal remedy for injuries suffered from violations ofthe automatic
stay. The Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits provide to corporations
harmed by a violation of a stay no redress under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
C. PlainMeaning: U.S. Supreme Court'sStandardof Interpretation
In United States v. Ron PairEnterprises,Inc.,' the Supreme Court adopted a
plain-meaning approach to resolving issues ofstatutory construction arising under the
Federal Bankruptcy Code.'37 Since Ron Pair,the Court has applied a literal approach
to interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code. Statutory interpretation requires the

130. Id. at 327.
131. Id. at 328-29.
132. 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
133. In re Ad.Bus., 901 F.2d at 329.
134. See id.; Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292.
135. E.g., Jim Nolker Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Richie (In re Jim Nolker
Chevrolet-Buick-Oldsmobile, Inc.), 121 B.R. 20,22 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (following the
Third and Fourth Circuits' holding that § 362(h) is applicable to corporations); Uecker v.
Davidson (In re Bair Island Marina & Office Ctr.), 116 B.R. 180, 185 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1990) (interpreting "individual" to include corporate entity); Mallard Pond Partners v.
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (In re Mallard Pond Partners), 113 B.R. 420, 421-23 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1990) (addressing the legislative history of § 362); United States v. Acad.
Answering Serv., Inc. (In re Acad. Answering Serv., Inc.), 100 B.R. 327, 329 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1989) (rejecting argument that corporate debtors should be denied recovery under §
362(h)); Schewe v. Fairview Estates (In re Schewe), 94 B.R. 938, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1989) (stating that "individual" encompasses corporations); In re NWFX, Inc., 81 B.R. 500,
503 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987) (stating that damages under § 362(h) not limited to
"individuals" but applicable to corporate debtors); see also Carroll, supra note 23, at 270.
136. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
137. Id. at 240-41.
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judiciary to construe the text of a statute so as to give effect to the intention of the
legislature.'38 Under the doctrine of plain meaning, courts enforce the literal
application of a statute without referring to the legislative history when the language
itself is capable of only one interpretation. 139 However, when faced with an
ambiguous statute, the Court turns to the legislative history to supply meaning to the
text. a4 Following Ron Pair,the Court's decisions have shifted towards a strict
textualist construction of the Bankruptcy Code.' 4 ' The Supreme Court held in Ron
Pairthat the Bankruptcy Code should be construed according to its terms, unless it
is clear that Congress's purpose behind the Code would be frustrated by such
interpretation. 42 In Ron Pair,the issue was whether § 506(b)'43 allowed a creditor to
receive post-petition interest for a nonconsensual, oversecured claim.'" At the time,
a split existed among the circuits as to whether § 506(b) permitted a pre-Code
practice distinguishing between nonconsensual and consensual liens in allocating
post-petition interests. 4 ' The Court held that post-petition interests were allowed on
nonconsensual and consensual, oversecured claims because Congress made
no
46
distinction in the statute's text between nonconsensual and consensual liens.
The Court went on to explain: "[I]t is not appropriate or realistic to expect
Congress to have explained with particularity each step it took. Rather, as long as the
statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to
inquire beyond the plain language of the statute." 47 The Supreme Court found the
plain language of§ 506(b) conclusive as to its meaning. Further, anyjudicial analysis
of the background, purpose, or legislative history would be inappropriate unless "the
literal application of [the] statute [would] produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters."'4 Ron Pair,the most recent Supreme Court case to
specifically address the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, adopted a textualistic
approach through a strict application of the plain-meaning rule.
Under § 362(h), the term at issue is "individual." The black letter definition of
"individual" is "a single person as distinguished from a group... [or] a private or
natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association ....
[However,] this restrictive signification is not necessarily inherent in the word, and

138. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975); Sinclair Refering Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195, 202-03 (1962), overruled in part on other groundsby Boy's Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'n,
310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940); see also Carroll, supra note 23, at 263.
139. Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 240-41; Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
140. See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 242; see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174
(1978).
141. E.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
142. See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 242.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
144. See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 237.
145. Id. at 237-38.
146. Id. at 242-43, 245-46.
147. Id. at 240-41.
148. Id. at 242 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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...it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons."'49 Since the Bankruptcy Code
does not define "individual," the majority position holds that the plain meaning of the
word refers to natural persons and thus fails to encompass corporate entities. 5 '
Therefore, following the Ron Pairanalysis, the majority holds that § 362(h) fails to
include corporate debtors because the plain meaning of the statute does not frustrate
the congressional intent behind the Bankruptcy Code.'
The actual analysis that the majority rule craftily employs is that Congress always
uses the word "person" when it seeks to include natural persons as well as corporate
entities; however, it uses the term "individual" to limit the application of a statute to
natural persons.' Because the plain meaning of§ 362(h) is so obvious to the Second,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, they find no need to look at the purpose,
background, or legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code. Unless the literal
application of § 362(h) produces results demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
Congress, courts adopting the majority rule will apply the plain meaning of the
statute. In contrast, the Third and Fourth Circuits hold that the plain meaning of §
362(h) fails to present the intentions of its drafters; thus, these circuits apply a more
expansive approach based on the purpose and legislative history of § 362."5
Legal scholars and judges alike have scrutinized plain-meaning interpretation of
statutes.'55 Application of this textual rule assumes that the denotations ofwords used
in statutes are self-evident. Yet, a word is only a symbol, and its interpretation may
differ depending on the context in which it is used. 5 6Words and phrases may present
inconsistent meanings because of the differing backgrounds and customs of the
interpreters. Specifically, statutes can appear ambiguous because the meaning of the

149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 773 (6th ed. 1990).
150. E.g., Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d
881, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1997); Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539,
1550-53 (11 th Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613,
619-20 (9th Cir. 1993); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 184-86 (2d Cir. 1990); see, e.g., Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel
(In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996).
151. In reJoveEng'g,Inc., 92 F.3d at 1550-53; In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 619-20; In re
Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 184-86.
152. In re Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d at 1551; In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 619-20; In re
Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 184-85.
153. Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 242.
154. Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986)
(upholding on appeal compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees for a violation
of a stay as to a corporate debtor); see Cuffee v. AtI. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus.
& Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d 325,329 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding §362(h) applicable to corporations
and partnerships).
155. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 316 (1991) (stating that statutes must be
construed in light ofpolicy objectives intended by Congress); Konrad Zweigert&Hans-Jtrgen
Puttfarken, Statutory Interpretation-CivilianStyle, 44 TUL L. REv. 704, 712-13 (1970)
(discussing diminishing usefulness of plain-meaning interpretation); Quintin Johnstone, An
Evolution of the Rules ofStatutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. REV.1 (1954) (criticizing
plain-meaning interpretation).
156. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTBERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (5th ed.
1992).
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language used by Congress does not coincide with the meaning understood by the
public.'57 Nonetheless, in Ron Pair,the Supreme Court adopted a plain-meaning
method of resolving statutory construction issues arising under the Federal
Bankruptcy Code.'58
Application of the Supreme Court's plain-meaning analysis to § 362(h) would
consist of an examination of the statute's text, structure, and composition." 9 This
literal analysis requires close attention to the grammatical structure of the statute, a
comparison of similar words in the statute, and consideration of the language used
throughout the statutory scheme."6 Section 362(h) would be construed to give effect
to each word contained within § 362 as well as the entire Bankruptcy Code. This
textualist approach presumes that the same words used more than once possess the
same meaning. Further, a plain-meaning analysis of § 362(h) would restrict judicial
inquiry into the legislative intent. Through drawing inferences from the structure and
composition of § 362(h) and construing its relationship to other parts of the
Bankruptcy Code, the plain meaning of the term "individual" would be ascertained
without assistance from legislative history or background considerations. Therefore,
if the Supreme Court employed plain-meaning analysis to § 362(h), it is likely that the
term "individual" would fail to include corporations. Because the literal meaning of
the word "individual" refers to natural persons, § 362(h) would not protect corporate
debtors from willful violations of the automatic stay.
However, it is unclear if the current Court would adopt a strict textualist approach
when interpreting § 362(h).16 ' The Rehnquist Court's shift towards plain-meaning
analysis has led to inconsistent holdings in bankruptcy cases. 62 With every case
turning on each Justice's interpretation of the statutory text, the Court has not
established overreaching principles that apply in specific bankruptcy cases.163 As a
result, the current "Rehnquist Court appears to drift from bankruptcy decision to
bankruptcy decision. The outcome of any particular case is becoming increasingly
difficult to predict."' 6 Three categories of recent Supreme Court bankruptcy cases
can be identified: (1) cases which purport to follow the plain-meaning app'roach,'
(2) cases that fail to describe the Court's methodology," and (3) cases that employ

157. See e.g., Carroll, supra note 23, at 263.
158. Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 240-46.
159. Id. at 241-42.
160. Id.
161. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,419-20 (1992) (moving slightly away from a plainmeaning interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code to briefly look at congressional intent and
policy-based considerations).
162. See Kelch, supra note 3, at 293.
163. See id.; see also Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and
Conjunctions:The Bankruptcy Jurisprudenceofthe Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
823, 880-81 (1991).
164. Tabb & Lawless, supra note 163, at 880.
165. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249 (1992); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
166. E.g., Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279 (1990); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990); Norwest Bank
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a non-plain-meaning approach. 67 Although the Court would likely adopt the Ron Pair
plain-meaning analysis when interpreting § 362(h), skepticism exists as to the
interpretive approach each of the Justices would employ. 6 '
Plain-meaning analysis, although presently dominating the Supreme Court's
construction of the Bankruptcy Code, is inherently flawed. Due to the ambiguities in
language, there will be differing interpretations of statutes. Therefore, by focusing on
the text alone, the Court fails to develop bankruptcy laws through the formulation and
evolution ofprinciples that can contribute to future audience analysis.'69 The Court's
current lack of policy analysis actually ignores the importance of bankruptcy
principles (for example, the promotion ofreorganization) and neglects to guide future
application of the Bankruptcy Code. 70 Plain-meaning analysis rejects the use of
legislative history or extrinsic sources to interpret § 362(h). This barrier placed
between the judicial reader and the legislature causes decisions that contradict the
Bankruptcy Code's purpose."' The Supreme Court, in the application of plainmeaning analysis, fails to recognize thepolicies andpurposes ofthe BankruptcyCode
and is likely to reach, conclusions at odds with the true intentions of Congress.
However, the relative newness of the Code, the detail with which it is written, the
depth of its historical meaning, its complex structure, and its substantive nature
(affecting commercial rights) establish the foundation on which the Court employs
a plain-meaning construction.' 72
D. Contempt: An Alternative Remedy for CorporateDebtors
As an alternative to recovery under § 362(h), a corporate debtor injured by a
violation of the stay may seek a remedy through civil contempt.7 3 However, the
imposition of a remedy under civil contempt is subject to a stricter standard than is
imposed by § 362(h) and does not afford the availability of punitive damages in
addition to compensatory damages. 74 Moreover, the bankruptcy courts' power to
impose contempt sanctions is subject to more extensive procedural requirements than
affording a remedy under § 362(h).'" Specifically, an action seeking a remedy under

Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
167. Nobelman v. Ar. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); United States
v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Farrey v.
Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); see also Kelch, supra note 3, at 294.
168. Tabb & Lawless, supra note 163, at 880-81.
169. Kelch, supra note 3, at 307.
170. Id.
171. See Kenneth N.Klee & Frank A. Merola, IgnoringCongressionalIntent: Eight Years
ofJudicialLegislation, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (1988).
172. Kelch, supra note 3, at 292.
173. Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,447 (10th Cir.
1990) (holding that automatic stay violators may be punished under civil contempt).
174. See Recovery of Damagesfor Willful Violation of the Stay, 3 COLLIER ON BANKR.
362.11[3] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 1998) [hereinafter Recovery].
175. Id.; see In re Skinner, 917 F.2d at 447; Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., 804
F.2d 289, 293 (4th Cir. 1986).
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§ 362(h) is a core proceeding that can be decided by bankruptcy courts.176 Whereas,
civil contempt is treated similar to a noncore proceeding, which is subject to de novo
review by the district court.'" In reality, the relationship between § 362(h) damage
awards and contempt as a source of recovery is unclear. The way the two remedies
fit together is quite murky and depends on the individual bankruptcy court's and
district court's applications.'
In 1978, Congress granted broad jurisdiction to newly created bankruptcy courts
through the enactment of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 79 In Northern Pipeline
ConstructionCo. v. MarathonPipeLine Co.,'"0 the Supreme Court faced a challenge
to the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Code based on the claim that it encroached
upon the powers of federal courts.8 The Court held that the Code was
unconstitutional because Article III of the U.S. Constitution "bars Congress from
establishing legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those
arising under the bankruptcy laws."" 2 Following the decision, Congress substantially
amended sections of the Bankruptcy Code in conformance with Article III of the
Constitution and the Northern Pipelinedecision.
Included in the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code was the modification of two
sections that directly address the bankruptcy courts' ability to issue civil contempt
orders. First was § 105(a),' which was modified to provide:
The [bankruptcy] court may issue any order, process, or judgement that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be
construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any
determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or
rules, or to prevent an abuse of process."
Second, in response to the Northern Pipeline holding, § 157 of Title 281"5 was
amended to provide:
(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title I and any
or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title II shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title I I and
all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and

176. In re Skinner,917 F.2d at 446.
177. Id.; see also Recovery, supra note 174, 362.11 [3].
178. DAvID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3-35, at 170 (1993).
179. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 54 (1982) ("The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts
created by the Act is much broader than that exercised under the former referee system.").
180. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
181. Id. at 56-57.
182. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
183. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994).
184. Id.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Title 28 deals with practices and procedures for federal courts.
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judgements, subject to review under section 158 of this title.'

Therefore, § 105(a) gives bankruptcy courts the power to take actions necessary to
carry out Title 11187 provisions, and § 157 of Title 28 gives bankruptcy courts the
authority to decide Title 11 bankruptcy proceedings. 88 Courts that impose civil
contempt orders 8for
violation of an automatic stay use § 105(a), § 157, or both to
9
award damages.1

A great deal of confusion surrounds whether bankruptcy courts possess civil
contempt powers, and if so, where those powers originate. Depending on the
jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts can (1) issue and enforce civil contempt orders
themselves,"9 (2) certify the issue to the district court,191 or (3) decide the contempt
issue and then pass it on to the district court for review and enforcement. 9 In Burd
v. Walters (In re Walters), 93 the Fourth Circuit concluded that bankruptcy courts
have clear authority to issue and enforce civil contempt orders. 94 Through analyzing
§ 105(a), the court held Congress could constitutionally grant bankruptcy courts the
power to enforce its orders through the use of civil contempt.9 Other courts have
held that bankruptcy courts possess the power to issue and enforce civil coreproceeding contempt orders through analysis of§ 157 of Title 28.196 Classifying civil

contempt as a core bankruptcy proceeding under § 157 permits bankruptcy courts to
hear, determine, and enter contempt orders independent of district courts.
Otherjurisdictions hold thatbankruptcy courts must certify the civil contempt issue

186. Id. § 157(a)-(b)(1).
187: 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Title 11 is the Federal Bankruptcy
Code.
188. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 157.
189. Mountair Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447-48 (10th
Cir. 1990) (using both); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989)
(using § 105(a)); In re Xavier's of Beville, Inc., 172 B.R. 667, 672 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994)
(using § 105(a)); Fry v. Today's Homes (In re Fry), 122 B.R. 427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1990) (using § 105(a)); In re InCor, Inc., 113 B.R. 212,217 (D. Md. 1990) (using § 157); In
re Lee Way Holding Co., 104 B.R. 881, 885-86 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (using § 157).
190. In re Skinner, 917 F.2d at 446, 448-49; In re Walters, 868 F.2d at 669; Budget Serv.
Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292-93 (4th Cir. 1986); AP Indus. v. SN
Phelps & Co. (In re AP Indus.), 117 B.R. 789, 802-03 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); Dubin v.
Jakobowski (In re Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 B.R. 377, 386-88 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988);
Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944,948 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
191. Plastiras v. Idell (In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281, 1288-89 (9th Cir.
1987).
192. Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1993); see In re
Washtenaw/Huron Inv. Corp. No. 8, 160 B.R. 74, 79 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
193. 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
194. Id. at 669.
195. Id. at 670.
196. Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447-49 (10th
Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,292 (4th Cir. 1986);
AP Indus. v. SN Phelps & Co. (In re AP Indus.), 117 B.R. 789,797 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990);
Dubin v. Jakobowski (In re Stephen W. Grosse, P.C.), 84 B.R. 377, 386 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.
1988); Gibbons v. Haddad (In re Haddad), 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
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to the federal district court for that court's judge to decide. For example, the Ninth
Circuit in Plastirasv. Idell (In re SequoiaAuto Brokers Ltd.)' 97 found that there was
no express or implied statutory authority allowing bankruptcy judges to exercise
contempt powers.' 98 Thus, in that circuit, bankruptcy courts do not possess
jurisdiction over civil contempt proceedings. The couit failed to find § 105(a) as a
source of civil contempt power because it was overly broad.'" However, the In re
Sequoia Auto Brokers decision did not preclude a finding of contempt in a
bankruptcy proceeding. According to the Ninth Circuit, the bankruptcy court must
certify the contempt issue to the federal district court for decision and enforcement."°
Alternatively, in somejurisdictions, bankruptcy courts decide the issue ofcontempt
and then pass it on to the district court for review and enforcement.2 ' These district
court decisions rely on Federal Rule ofBankruptcyProcedure 9020202 when analyzing
contempt determinations made by bankruptcy judges.2 3 Bankruptcy Rule 9020
establishes a procedure for courts to deal with contempt. It provides that the
bankruptcy judge may summarily determine actions of contempt committed in the
direct presence of the bankruptcy court."' Other actions of contempt may be

197. 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987).
198. Id. at 1288-89.
199. Id. at 1290.

200. Id. at 1291.
201. Brown v. Ramsey (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1993); Mutual Benefit
Life Ins. Co. v. Pinetree, Ltd. (In re Pinetree, Ltd.), 876 F.2d 34,36-38 (5th Cir. 1989); see In
re Washtenaw/Huron Inv. Corp. No. 8, 160 B.R. 74, 79 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
202. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9020, as promulgated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, provides as follows:
(a) Contempt Committed in Presence ofBankruptcy Judge. Contempt committed
in the presence of a bankruptcy judge may be determined summarily, by a
bankruptcyjudge. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed
by the bankruptcy judge and entered of record.
(b) Other Contempt. Contempt committed in a case or proceeding pending
before a bankruptcy judge, except when determined as provided in subdivision
(a) of this rule, may be determined by the bankruptcy judge only after a hearing
on notice. The notice shall be in writing, shall state the essential facts constituting
the contempt charged and describe the contempt as criminal or civil and shall
state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation
of the defense. The notice may be given on the court's own initiative or on
application of the United States attorney or by an attorney appointed by the
court ....
(c) Service and Effective Date ofOrder; Review. The clerk shall serve forthwith
a copy of the order of contempt on the entity rnamed therein. The order shall be
effective 10 days after service of the order and shall have the same force and
effect as an order of contempt entered by the district court unless, within the 10
day period, the entity named therein serves and files objections prepared in the
manner provided in Rule 9033(b). If timely objections are filed, the order shall
be reviewed [de novo by the district court] as provided in Rule 9033.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020 (emphasis added).
203. See e.g., Mataya v. Kissinger (In re Kissinger), 72 F.3d 107 (9th Cir. 1995).
204. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9021(a).
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determined by the bankruptcy judge following a hearing on notice. "° Under Rule
9020, a bankruptcy judge's order of contempt has the same force as an order entered
by the district court judge unless, within ten days of the order, the party held in
contempt files objections, in which case the district court will review the order de
novo.2" Thus, Rule 9020 gives bankruptcy courts power to deal with contempt;
however, the bankruptcy judge's findings are subject to district court review.
The damage remedy under § 362(h) for violation of a stay is fairly new. It was
added to the Federal Bankruptcy Code in 1984.0" Prior to 1984, an award of damages
for injuries suffered from a violation of a stay was usually grounded in the court's
civil contempt power.2" 8 The existence of contempt power is important; however,
much confusion surrounds its relation to § 362(h) when a court provides damages for
violation of an automatic stay. For example, some courts use discretionary contempt
power to award damages to corporate debtors, while others use § 362(h), granting
mandatory relief to corporations injured by violation of a stay.2" Although civil
contempt power provides an alternative to § 362(h), courts infer a higher standard of
proof when issuing a contempt order. Courts have noted that, to support a finding of
contempt, the moving party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that an
automatic stay was in effect, the defendant knew of the stay, and the defendant
purposefully violated the stay.2"' This standard of proof exceeds that of "willful
violation" as established under § 362(h).2 Adding to the confusion is the continuous
speculation as to whether civil contempt damages are an equal remedy to the recovery
provided for under § 362(h).212
Some courts have acknowledged the major differences between the use of civil
contempt orders and the use of § 362(h) to compensate injured corporate debtors. The
Ninth Circuit recognizes that, unlike § 362(h), civil contempt orders are discretionary;
thus, courts are not required to award relief through contempt even when corporations

205. Id. 9021(b).
206. Id. 9021(c); see also In re Kissinger,72 F.3d at 108.
207. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §
304,98 Stat. 333 (codified as 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994)).
208. EPSTEIN ETAL, supra note 178, § 3-35, at 170.
209. Compare Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Pinetree, Ltd. (In re Pinetree, Ltd.), 876 F.2d
34, 36 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying civil contempt power to award damages for violation of a
stay), with Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986)
(awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees for a violation of a
stay as to a corporate debtor under § 362(h)).
210. In re Berryhill, 127 B.R. 427,429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991); Lakefield Tel. Co. v. N.
Telecomm., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 413,423 (E.D. Wis. 1988); Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial
Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 699 (E.D. Wis. 1982), af'd,712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983).
211. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1994); see also Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan (In re Univ. Med.
Ctr.), 973 F.2d 1065, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1992); Price v. Rochford, 947 F.2d 829, 831 (7th Cir.
1991); Atkins v. Martinez (In re Atkins), 176 B.R. 998, 1008 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994); In re
Herbst, 167 B.R. 983,985 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1994); Temlock v. Falls Bldg., Ltd. (In re Falls
Bldg., Ltd.), 94 B.R. 471, 481 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988); Stucka v. United States (In re
Stucka), 77 B.R. 777,783 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
212. See WILLIAML.NORTON, JR.,2 NORTONBANKRUpTCY LAW& PRACTICE §§ 36:42-:44
(2d ed. 1997).
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qualify for damages.213 This distinction is critical to corporations who are injured by
a violation of an automatic stay. Under the contempt theory of damages, courts have
full discretion to deny a request for a civil contempt order against stay violators and
thereby refuse to provide a legal remedy to corporate debtors. Therefore, failure to
allow corporate entities relief under § 362(h) leaves injured corporate debtors at the
mercy of the judge's discretion. This lack ofpredictability is exactly the concern that
led the Third and Fourth Circuits to find that the term "individual" included
214
corporations and thus provide corporate debtors with a legal remedy. Although civil
contempt may provide an alternative remedy to § 362(h) damages, contempt fails to
provide a uniform result; rather, it gives judges full discretion as to relief measures.
If there is no uniform system to deter creditors from violating the automatic stay,
violations will become the norm.
E. The Futureof§ 362(h): CorporateDebtors
Are Entitled to Legal Remedies
In the custom of nearsighted legislation, Congress neglected to define the
application of § 362(h) to corporate debtors. 1 5 In response, six circuits have
specifically addressed whether § 362(h) applies to corporations. Two circuits have
found that the language of§ 362(h) includes corporate entities, whereas four circuits
hold that it applies only to natural persons." 6 Within the five circuits yet to address
the issue, the district courts are split as to the application of § 362(h) to
corporations.2 17 Because of the many discrepant judicial interpretations of § 362(h),

213. Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613, 619-20 (9th Cir.
1987); see Mataya v. Kissinger (In re Kissinger), 72 F.3d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1995).
214. See Cuffee v. At. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d
325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292.
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). This is not unexpected considering that legislators can win or
lose their seats depending on their fiscal policy.
216. See In reAtl. Bus., 901 F.2d at 329 (finding § 326(h) applicable to corporations and
partnerships); Budget Serv., 804 F.2d at 292 (holding §326(h) applicable to corporate debtors).
But see Sosne v. Reinert &Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108 F.3d 881,
884-85 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding §362(h) not applicable to corporate debtor); Cal. Employment
Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to sanction under § 362(h) because the Chapter 7 trustee was not an "individual"); Jove Eng'g,
Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1552 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that § 362(h)
does not include corporations); Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co., (In re
Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding § 362(h) not applicable to
corporate debtor).
217. See Martino v. First Nat'l Bank of Harvey (In re Garofalo's Finer Foods), 186 B.R.
414,439 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that corporate entity is an "individual" for the purposes of
§ 362(h)); Mann v. Marine Bank W. (In re Omni Graphics, Inc.), 119 B.R. 641, 644 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1990) (finding that the term "individual" as used in §362(h) includes corporations).
But see McRoberts v. S.I.V.I. (In re Bequette), 184 B.R. 327, 335 (Bankr. S.D. I11.1995)
(holding that §362(h) is limited to natural persons and is not available to corporations); United
States v. Midway Indus. Contractors (In re Midway Indus. Contractors), 178 B.R. 734, 738
(Bankr. N.D. III. 1995) (holding § 362(h) is not applicable to corporate debtors). For example,
within the Seventh Circuit, bankruptcy courts and district courts alike are split on the issue of
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the future is unclear. Currently, a corporate entity injured by a violation of an
automatic stay faces unpredictable results from a judicial remedy. The present
uncertainties facing injured corporate debtors include whether § 362(h) applies,
whether civil contempt applies, and whether the corporate debtor will receive a legal
remedy when injured by a "willful violation" of the law. These lingering uncertainties
undermine the intended purpose of § 362(h).
Section 362(h) is designed to deter violators and to compensate those injured by
violations of the automatic stay."' It is therefore irrelevant whether the victim is a
natural person or corporate entity. The purpose of § 362(h) will be destroyed if
creditors can violate the automatic stay without suffering repercussions under the
Bankruptcy Code. For this reason, remedial measures must be taken to provide a
uniform remedy to corporations who are injured by a violation of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code. Two viable alternatives exist: (1) the U.S. Supreme Court should
address the issue, or (2) Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to make
specific their intentions as to the applicability of§ 362(h). Either way, the confusion
surrounding the interpretation of § 362(h) and its relation to civil contempt must be
addressed. To date, enormous amounts of time and money have been invested in
litigating the applicability of § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Under the
status quo, the forecast for the future is continued heavy litigation. However, a swift
stroke ofjudicial activism or legislative responsiveness will implement an efficient
and uniform application of § 362(h), thereby reducing litigation.
The Federal Bankruptcy Code possesses two primary purposes: first, to uphold
order in the face ofa debtor's inability to pay debts and second, to rehabilitate debtors
by providing a fresh start." 9 The automatic stay was one of the primary provisions
enacted to allow parties in a bankruptcy proceeding to achieve both of these goals.
Further, Congress identified the importance of the automatic stay as "one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." ' The automatic
stay not only protects corporate debtors, but it also provides corporate creditors with
protection. 22' The purpose of § 362(h) is to deter violators and provide damages to
those who are injured by a violation of the stay. Therefore, since the automatic stay
provided for in § 362(a) protects corporate entities from unlawful debt collections,
it makes sense to provide corporate debtors, injured by stay violators, a legal remedy
under § 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. Those courts which fail to apply § 362(h) to
corporate entities in effect deny corporate debtors legal remedies under the Federal
Bankruptcy Code and raise an unwarranted green light to creditors.
As the honorable Judge Learned Hand once stated, "There is no surer way to
misread any document than to read it literally." m Judge Hand's maxim is particularly
apt in describing judicial interpretation of the term "individual" as it appears in §
362(h). It is likely the case that Congress failed to consider the usage of the word

whether § 362(h) is applicable to corporate debtors.
218. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
219. COMM'N ON THE BANKRuiTcY LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
pt. 1, at 84 (1973).
220. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296.
221. See I I U.S.C. § 362(a).
222. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., concurring).
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"individual" when haphazardly drafting § 362(h). This is evinced by the lack of
legislative history addressing the application of § 362(h) coupled with the Bankruptcy
Code's failure to define the word "individual."' For these reasons, § 362(h) must
be read in conjunction with the rest of § 362. In so doing, the imposition of sanctions
will not be limited to "individuals" in the literal sense. Because § 362 provides
automatic stay protection to corporations, it is highly likely that Congress intended
a legal remedy for corporations injured by a violation of a § 362 stay. It is unlikely
that Congress intended to give a remedy only to "individual" debtors as opposed to
both corporate entities and natural persons. Such a narrow construction of the word
"individual" defeats the purpose of § 362, and, therefore, § 362(h) must be
interpreted to include corporate debtors.
To solve of the confusion surrounding § 362(h), Congress should amend the
Bankruptcy Code. By simply replacing the word "individual" with "person," 4
Congress would thereby allow corporate entities to recover remedies for injuries
suffered as a result of violations of an automatic stay. If Congress does not intend to
provide legal remedies to corporations, the purpose of § 362 as applied to corporate
debtors is defeated.2" Although civil contempt may provide an alternative remedy,
imposition of these sanctions is subject to a stricter standard than is § 362(h) and does
not afford the availability of punitive damages in addition to compensatory
damages. 6 Because of inadequate legal remedies available to aggrieved corporate
entities,2 7 Congress must amend § 362(h) to uniformly apply to corporate debtors.
Conversely, if Congress neglects to address the confusion surrounding § 362(h),
the issue is ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court. In addressing the issue, the Court may
base its decision on the plain meaning of the statute, its social purpose, the
legislature's intent, a dynamic interpretation, a common-law type of case analysis, or
some combination of approaches. 8 Under its strategy of construction in Ron Pair,
it is likely that the Court will embrace a plain-meaning approach 29 to resolving this
current issue arising under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. However, it is possible that

223. See Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d.
183, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1990).
224. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41). Section 101(41) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "person" to
include "individual, partnership, and corporation." Id.
225. What purpose does §362 serve if violators ofan automatic stay are not held responsible
for their actions?-none. Creditors who violate a stay against a corporate debtor must be held
legally responsible under § 362(h) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
226. Recovery, supra note 174, 362.11[3].
227. See, e.g., Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108
F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1997); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539 (1Ith
Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d. 613 (9th Cir. 1993);
Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1990). All of these cases held that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporations.
228. See 2A NoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION §§ 45-49 (5th
ed. 1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U.PA. L. REV.
1479, 1481-87 (1987).
229. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1989); see also supra
Part III.C.

2001]

INCLUDING CORPORATE DEBTORS UNDER § 362(H)

269

a majority of the Court will deliver itself from this elementary method of judicial
interpretation and apply a policy-based analysis of § 362(h) through which a
conceptual structure can be established for future cases. The further application of a
narrow, plain-meaning analysis will do nothing more than produce unintelligible,
unjustified rationales. This current Supreme Court trend of textualism in bankruptcy
jurisprudence rejects policy considerations necessary for a proper application of §
362(h).
However, even if the Court applies the Ron Pairanalysis to the construction of §
362(h), all hope may not be lost for corporate debtors under plain.-meaning
interpretation. In Ron Pair,the Court states that the plain meaning of the statute is
conclusive "'except in the rare case [in which] the literal application... will produce
a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters."' 0 In such an
instance, "the intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls."'"
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not define the word "individual," there is no sure
way for the Court to know the true intention of the drafters. Moreover, the absence
of legislative history addressing § 362(h) suggests the likelihood of a legislative
drafting error. 2 The argument can be made that the intention of the drafters is
unknown; therefore, a literal application of § 362(h) cannot produce a result clearly
in compliance with the intention of the drafters. In this situation, a literal application
of the term "individual" produces a result demonstrably at odds with the legislature's
intentions. Subsequently, under the Ron Pairanalysis, the intention of the drafters
rather than the strict language controls. 3 To ascertain the intention of Congress, the
Court must analyze the legislative history of § 3 62(a)"4 and the policy considerations
surrounding the automatic stay. In so doing, the Court should find that such a narrow
construction of § 362(h) would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay and thus
should construe the word "individual" to include corporations.
As it stands, the future of § 362(h) is troubling. Currently four circuits fail to allow
corporate entities injured by a violation of a stay recovery under the Federal
Bankruptcy Code." Courts that limit the application of § 362(h) to natural persons

230. Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 242 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
571 (1982)).
231. Id.
232. If Congress intended to provide corporate debtors protection under the automatic stay
provision of § 362(a), yet intended to provide no remedy for a violation of such a stay under
§362(h), it is ajustified assumption that there would exist some legislative history surrounding
this issue. The automatic stay is one of the fundamental protections afforded bythe Bankruptcy
Code. If Congress intended to provide corporate entities with no legal remedies for a violation
of a stay, it is likely legislative history would reveal this.
233. See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 242-43.
234. See H.R. REP.NO. 95-595, at 340 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,629698.
235. See, e.g., Sosne v. Reinert & Duree, P.C. (In re Just Brakes Corporate Sys., Inc.), 108
F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 1997); Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng'g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539 (11 th
Cir. 1996); Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d. 613 (9th Cir. 1993);
Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.
1990). All of these cases held that § 362(h) is not applicable to corporations.
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severely diminish the protection provided by the automatic stay. Corporate
entities-debtors and creditors alike-under the jurisdiction of these courts receive
no bankruptcy process protection against the depletion of assets by unlawful actions
of credit collectors. Regardless of whether Congress amends § 362(h) or the U.S.
Supreme Court addresses the issue, corporate debtors injured by violations of the
automatic stay should be included in the class of "individuals" entitled to legal
remedies under the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Note argues that, as a final benefit, corporate debtors injured by a willful
violation of an automatic stay should recover actual damages, including costs and
attorneys' fees, and under appropriate conditi6ns, should recover punitive damages.
Under the American jurisprudence system, corporations are afforded the same rights
and responsibilities as an individual person. Therefore, there is no reason why
corporations should be denied equal access to a legal remedy under federal law.
The automatic stay is generally considered one of the most (if not the most)
fundamental provisions contained within the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 6 As such,
the automatic stay must judiciously apply to protect individual and corporate debtors
alike. Although § 362(h) was codified to enforce this provision, the scope of its
application has been muddied by the decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals.
While the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have limited the reach of §
362(h) to include only natural persons, the Third and Fourth Circuits have correctly
extended it to allow injured corporate debtors to recover damages. 7 An examination
of§ 362 as a whole, as well as its legislative history, reveals the wisdom of the Third
and Fourth Circuits' decisions to protect debtor and creditor corporations.s
Finally, the civil contempt remedy falls short of an adequate alternative to § 362(h)
sanctions. Not only does civil contempt fail to provide a corporate debtor with
punitive damages, but it also is a highly discretionary award which is subject to an
increased standard of proof and inconsistent procedural processes." 9 The civil
contempt remedy is an unreliable mechanism by which to uphold a fundamental
provision of the U.S. Code. Thus, § 362(h) must be applied to provide corporations
injured by a violation of an automatic stay a legal remedy under the Federal
Bankruptcy Code.

236. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340.
237. See Cuffee v. AtI. Bus. & Cmty. Dev. Corp. (In re At. Bus. &Cmty. Corp.), 901 F.2d
325, 329 (3d Cir. 1990); Budget Serv. Co. v. Better Homes of Va., Inc., 804 F.2d 289,292 (4th
Cir. 1986). But see In reJustBrakes, 108 F.3d at 886-88; In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 115152; In re Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d at 1542-44; In re Goodman, 991 F.2d at 619-20; In re
Chateaugay,920 F.2d at 185-86.
238. See In re At. Bus., 901 F.2d at 329 (finding § 326(h) applicable to corporations and
partnerships); BudgetServ., 804 F.2:d at 292 (holding §326(h) applicable to corporate debtors).
239. See Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444,447-49 (10th
Cir. 1990); see also Recovery, supra note 174, 362.11 [3].

